A wide range of knowledge structures can be activated by situational contexts.
periment 2, a conventional idiom, "break a leg," produced divergent priming ef fects when used idiomatically than when used literally. In addition, we found evidence for inhibition of irrelevant literal meanings in Experiments 3a and 3b that provided support for the role of inhibitory processes in metaphor and idiom com prehension. Implications for how figurative language might differentially activate knowledge structures and the role of inhibitory processes in social perception are discussed.
A wide range of knowledge structures can be activated by situational contexts. Attitudes (Bargh, Chaiken, Governder, & Pratto, 1992) , stereo types (Devine, 1989) , and even the self-concept (Bargh & Tota, 1988) have all been shown to be automatically activated by the mere presence 36 GALINSKY AND GLUCKSBERG of a relevant object or symbol in the environment. Thinking processes can also be primed from constructs that suggest relationships among ob jects (Higgins & Chaires, 1980) , to the mental simulation induced by ex posure to a counterfactual event (Galinsky, Moskowitz, & Skurnik, in press). Activated knowledge structures made accessible through inci dental exposure can often influence the interpretation of subsequent ambiguous events and behaviors. The pervasiveness of this phenome non led Sedikides and Skowronski (1991) to conclude that there is a "fundamental law of cognitive structure activation." Given that the so cial world is often a buzzing and chaotic cauldron of complex informa tion (Gilbert & Hixon, 1992; James, 1890) and that social perceivers prefer a state of epistemological certainty to a state of doubt and uncer tainty (Heider, 1944; Moskowitz, Skurnik, & Galinsky, 1999) , activated knowledge structures reduce doubt and simplify the complex world to manageable levels by providing individuals with an interpretive frame for understanding subsequent information (Stapel, Koomen, & van der Pligt, 1996) . Higgins, Rholes, and Jones (1977) ticipants who had already been exposed to reckless-related words judged Donald to be more reckless than adventurous, whereas those participants who had seen the adventurousness-related words only judged Donald to be more adventurous than reckless. This priming ef fect was highly specific. In the Higgins et al. (1977) study, no effect was found when participants were primed with trait words that were either positive (e.g., satirical, grateful) or negative (e.g., listless, disrespectful) but were inapplicable to the Donald paragraph. Higgins et al. (1977) con cluded that semantic primes exert an influence, not through the evaluative connotations of the traits, but through direct activation of a trait construct and its related meanings. "If a [primed] construct is appli cable to the stimulus (i.e., there is sufficient match between the features of the construct and the features of the stimulus), then it will be used to encode or categorize the stimulus" (Higgins & Chaires, 1980, p. 351) .
One criticism of the initial priming studies was that the knowledge structures were activated in artificial settings that were divorced from the typical contexts in which social information was encountered.
FIGURATIVE PRIMING 37 Moskowitz and Roman (1992) extended the ecological validity of both spontaneous trait inferences and previous priming studies by using stimuli that passively activated trait constructs during comprehension. They used trait-implying sentences that previous research (Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996) (Austin, 1962; Anderson & Ortony, 1975; Gernsbacher, 1990; Glucksberg & Estes, in press; Simpson, 1984 Simpson, , 1994 Simpson & Krueger, 1991 (Gibbs, 1994) .
FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE
Metaphors pervade autobiographical accounts, particularly those with strong emotional content, and even novel metaphors occur more than once per minute during ordinary discourse (Gibbs, 1994) . Metaphors (a) provide linguistic outlets for concepts that are difficult to convey using literal language; (b) are concise and satisfy the Gricean maxim of quan tity (Grice, 1975) ; and (c) convey the complexity and vividness of phenomenological experience (Ortony, 1975) . Gibbs (1994) (Gibbs, 1994; Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990) . Glucksberg and Keysar (1990) have suggested that metaphors are class-inclusion assertions in which the metaphor vehicle refers to a diagnostic category constructed on the fly (Barsalou, 1983) and is a prototypical member of that category (Rosch, 1978 (Glucksberg, McGlone, & Manfredi, 1997 First, participants were presented with the prime stories. They were told to read the story carefully because they would be asked questions about it later. Next, participants were given a counting backwards task in order to clear working memory (Higgins et al., 1977) . The two pages after the counting backwards task presented the impression formation task. Previous research has found that when the priming and judgment tasks are not sufficiently distinct, participants attempt to control for any 4U GALINSKY AND GLUCKSBERG effects that the prime might have on their subsequent judgments (Mar tin, 1986) . To minimize this possibility, the two pages of the impression formation task were presented in a different font from the prime sce nario (Galinsky et al., in press 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Judgments of Donald differed as a function of prime type, F(2, 64) = 6.5, p < .01. Donald was rated the most reckless (M = 5.9) after the prime "you're playing with fire" and the least reckless (M = 4.0) after the prime "You're on fire." Judgments of Donald after the control prime in which a literal reference to fire was made fell between the two metaphorical primes (M = 4.8). Primed with a metaphor that activated the construct dangerousness, participants judged Donald to be reckless. Previous ex posure to figurative speech that implied immunity from harm led to judgments of Donald as less reckless and more adventurous. A linear contrast was significant, F(l,64) = 13.00, p < .001, and the residual was not, F(l,64) < 1. The a priori hypothesis is thus strongly supported and is sufficient to account for the nonchance variation in the data (Abelson & Prentice, 1998 According to Gernsbacher's (1990) (Gernsbacher, 1990) . As expected, metaphor-irrelevant proper ties were selectively inhibited. For example, in the metaphor "My lawyer is a shark," properties that were only associated with literal sharks and are thus metaphor-irrelevant (e.g., the skilled swimming of sharks) were actively inhibited. Our impression formation task can be construed as an analog of the independent cue technique. There is no obvious connection between the Donald story, which is analogous to the probe sentences in the independent cue paradigm, and the protago nist in the earlier priming scenarios, yet impressions of Donald were in fluenced by the relevant material in those scenarios. Taken as a whole, our current findings of positive and negative prim ing effects provide additional evidence that metaphors and idioms pro duce enhancement of relevant and inhibition of irrelevant information.
Furthermore, this differential activation can affect subsequent evalua tions and impressions of apparently unrelated objects.
With respect to judgmental priming, our findings argue for the eco logical validity of priming effects (Moskowitz & Roman, 1992) . Meta phors and idioms are frequently used in everyday discourse (Gibbs, 1994) , and so constructs activated during metaphor comprehension could affect a wide variety of subsequent judgments and behaviors. The more frequently a construct is activated the stronger and more last ing are its accessibility effects (Srull & Wyer, 1980) . Often, the same con cept is expressed and elaborated several times in discourse through different instantiations of the same conceptual metaphor. Allbritton, McKoon, and Gerrig (1995) Similarly, Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1996) (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Chen & Bargh, 1997 (Martin, 1986); when the primes serve as a stan-dard of comparison (Herr, 1986 The descriptions of the processes involved in contrast effects (see imply that contrast effects are generated at the time of the judgment and not at the time of the primes. In support of the notion that contrast effects occur at the time of judgment, 
